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INTRODUCTION: THE ART OF ART HISTORY  
IN GRECO-ROMAN ANTIQUITY*
MICHAEL SQUIRE
This volume interrogates a tension fundamental to the project of “classi-
cal art history.” To what extent can we talk about the processes of making, 
viewing, and writing about images in classical antiquity as “art history”? Is 
it justified to discuss ancient “art” as art in the first place? And if modern 
systems of “the arts” are anachronistic, what language should be used to 
analyze the qualities and experiences associated with viewing images—or, 
indeed, responding to other media—in ancient Greek and Roman histori-
cal perspective?
Nothing better exposes—or rather conceals—this tension than a 
painting by the Dutch-born, British artist Sir Lawrence Alma-Tadema (fig-
ure 1).1 The title of the painting confirms that we are dealing with A  Picture 
 * As explained below, this co-edited volume stems from an organizer-refereed panel at the 
annual meetings of the American Philological Association and Archaeological Institute of 
America at Philadelphia in January 2009; our ideas were greatly sharpened by the lively 
discussion after the panel. Although written by only one of the editors, this introduction 
formulates ideas that have occupied us both for some considerable time. The chapter itself 
was written during the generous tenure of an Alexander von Humboldt Fellowship at the 
Winckelmann Institut für klassische Archäologie, Humboldt Universität zu Berlin. For their 
comments on an earlier draft, I am grateful not only to the volume’s contributors (above 
all to Verity Platt), but also to the anonymous external reviewer, Charles Martindale, and 
Luca Giuliani. On behalf of all the contributors, moreover, our collective thanks to the 
team at Arethusa—especially Martha Malamud, John Dugan, and Madeleine Kaufman—
for publishing the volume with such enthusiasm, care, and efficiency.
 All translations are my own unless otherwise stated.
 1 On the painting (Opus CXXVI), which formed a pair with a second image of an imagined 
ancient Sculpture Gallery, see Swanson 1990.175, no. 165. More generally on painted 
Victorian recreations of Rome, see Prettejohn 1996 and (specifically on Alma-Tadema) 
Prettejohn 2002. 
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 2 The painting derives from a floor mosaic excavated from the House of the Faun in 1831; 
for a full discussion, see Cohen 1997. 
 3 See Pliny HN 35.73, 136. The context of the incomplete Medea portrait from Hercula-
neum (MNN inv. 9976) is not known, although the wider Greek and Roman reception of 
Timomachus’s lost painting is well treated in Gutzwiller 2004a (with full bibliography 
concerning the Herculaneum painting at 342, n. 8). On the original context of the Iphigenia 
painting (MNN inv. 9112) in the House of the Tragic Poet, Pompeii VI.8.3, see Bergmann 
1994.249–54. Alma-Tadema visited Pompeii in 1863.
 4 On the centrality of the frame to modern western definitions of art, (erroneously) deemed 
to separate the privileged realm of the aesthetic from the mundane world of the “interested” 
observer of everyday existence surrounding it, the crucial analysis is Derrida 1987.37–82, 
responding to Kant 1987.72 (§14). Duro 1996 examines the subsequent “rhetoric” of the 
frame in the modern visual arts. For framing devices in Greco-Roman visual culture, 
though, see Platt and Squire forthcoming. 
 5 Following Pliny the Elder, the landscape at the center of the back wall is attributed to 
Marcus Ludius (HN 35.116–17), and the rather Venetian-looking lion to the lower right is 
ascribed to [Pau]sias (HN 35.123–27)—although one has to know one’s Pliny to get the 
teasingly laconic reference. Note, too, the inscriptions surrounding the portrait of Nerva 
above the door and the inscribed central chair. In an earlier 1867 painting of the same 
scene, the Iphigenia scene is further inscribed with the name of Tima[nthes] (HN 35.73); 
see Swanson 1990.144–45, no. 90. 
Gallery. As so often with Alma-Tadema’s work, however, the painting col-
lapses the historical distance between the ancient world and late nineteenth-
 century Victorian Britain: this wistful archaeological reconstruction purports 
to depict not a modern picture gallery, but rather an ancient (or more spe-
cifically Roman) pinacotheca. This explains the various pictures on dis-
play, all of which derive from models known from Pompeii and Hercula-
neum: to the left can be seen the tell-tale horse and spears of the so-called 
“Alexander Mosaic”;2 in the center are images of Medea and the sacrifice 
of Iphigenia (associated with the Greek artists Timomachus and Timanthes 
respectively).3 Removed from their original frescoed walls in Campania and 
bounded within geometric surrounds, ornamental floral borders, or wooden 
cases, each attested image is presented as an autonomous panel-painting in 
its own right: the pictures within the picture are physically and metaphori-
cally framed like the paintings of the modern gallery (and Alma-Tadema’s 
gilded canvas itself).4 Other features similarly mirror the display strategies 
of the modern museum: note, for instance, how the legends accompanying 
these “masterworks” assign them to their relevant master artist, just like 
the inscription within the frame of Alma-Tadema’s own painting.5 This 
also explains the rather Victorian looking gallery-goers, dressed in Roman 
togas and shawls, but each nonetheless recognizable from the contempo-
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 6 See Swanson 1990.175, no. 165 and Barrow 2001.79. The standing figure at the center 
has the features of Ernest Gambart (Alma-Tadema’s dealer), and seated in front of him are 
Henry Wallis (an artist and dealer, thus shown at the easel), Charles Deschamps (Gambart’s 
nephew), and Madame Angelée (Gambart’s mistress). In the background are P. J. Pilgeram 
and Léon Lefèvre (Gambart’s successors), and to their right, Paul Durand-Ruel.
 7 Of course galleries of paintings, or pinacothecae, were an established feature of Hellenis-
tic and Roman visual display, and we know of much earlier collections of paintings too 
(like those assembled in the Athenian Propylaia in the fifth century); see, e.g., van Buren 
1938.76–80, Schefold 1952.32–34, Ehlich 1953.186–94, Ehlich 1979, esp. 8–20, Elsner 
1993, Strong 1994.13–39, Bergmann 1995, esp. 98–102. The question, though, must be 
about the differences as well as the similarities between ancient and modern practices: 
to what extent would such galleries have looked like this one or elicited these sorts of 
response? For a rather more “modernist” account of the Roman pinacotheca, see Tanner 
2006.267–73 on how “framing each picture as an independent object of visual interest” 
(271) “served to inculcate a rationalist sensibility, congruent with the cultural patterning 
of elite and rhetorical culture” (265).
 8 Cf. Tanner 2006.3, analyzing a different painting by the same artist: “Alma-Tadema’s 
paintings engage a series of key concepts in the modern institution of art as high culture 
and project them back onto classical antiquity: the heroic status of the artist as creator, 
the autonomy of art, and norms of cultivated connoisseurship on the part of authentic art 
lovers—all concepts which . . . still centrally inform the dominant paradigm in classical 
art history writing.”
rary British art scene.6 Their enraptured gaze fixates on a painting that we 
are unable to see. Depicting only the back of the easel cut off by his own 
picture frame, Alma-Tadema signals something sublime that, by its very 
nature, lies beyond the figurations of his canvas.
What is so interesting about this picture is its visual articulation 
of a familiar and coherent set of ideas about art, art history, and the history 
of artistic appreciation. Like Alma-Tadema’s painting exhibited in one of 
the galleries in Towneley Hall, the ancient images on display are deemed 
to invite a gaze of quiet reflection and considered contemplation; we are 
faced in this supposedly ancient gallery with art in its familiar, autonomous, 
post-Enlightenment form.7 Still more strikingly perhaps, the “classicism” of 
these Roman paintings is visually assimilated to the neoclassicism of Alma-
Tadema’s own painting: a shared stylistic ideal binds the ancient with the 
modern. In this way, the assumed “art” of antiquity goes hand in hand with a 
supposedly timeless aesthetic that stretches between the classical world and 
our own: the artist’s attempt at historical reenactment imposes contemporary 
frameworks of aesthetic appreciation onto antiquity, (con)fusing the modern 
art gallery with its imaginary Greco-Roman equivalent.8 In doing so, more-
over, Alma-Tadema visualizes the critical assumption that lies latent in the 
pursuit of all Greco-Roman art history precisely as “art history,” whether 
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 9 On the museological stakes here, the crucial volume remains Karp and Lavine 1990; note 
also Beard and Henderson 1995, on these themes in relation to the modern museological 
display of Greco-Roman material.
10 On the concept of “rationalization” in this context, see Tanner 2006.21–29 and Tanner in 
this volume. One does not have to go to a nineteenth-century painting to find the Roman 
household constructed as a locus for aesthetic reflection: classical archaeologists have 
verbally articulated the ideological assumptions that Alma-Tadema’s picture visualizes. 
Compare, e.g., Bartman 1991.82 on sculptural displays in the Roman house (citing Plin. 
HN 36.27): “In some respects the private realm of the domus provided a superior envi-
ronment for the pendant’s viewing and appreciation. In its gracious rooms and verdant 
courtyards the viewer was likely to find the quiet leisure necessary for the contemplation 
of nuances of form and meaning . . . For all its bestowal of status upon its proud pos-
sessor, the sculptural decor of the private dwelling could also serve to engage visitors in 
the formal refinements of the visual arts.” For a sophisticated reexamination of the issue, 
see Neudecker 1998, esp. 77–78.
11 As such, our project aligns with a renewed interest in the ideological histories of art his-
tory itself reflected in, e.g., Preziosi 1998. Although our edited volumes share a common 
title, our inflections are rather different—Preziosi’s emphasis is on the historiography of 
art history, while ours also lies in the assumed notions of “art” in the first place. 
in the academy or, indeed, the museum:9 namely, that ancient objects can 
be understood according to modern “aesthetic systems,” forged—or at least 
rationalized—during the course of the eighteenth century.10 
It is precisely the scare quotes surrounding “art,” “art history,” and 
“aesthetics” that this guest-edited issue of Arethusa sets out to interrogate. 
Taking our lead from a burgeoning bibliography beyond the traditional 
confines of classics, our aim is to probe the artifice of our own cultural dis-
courses of “art,” as much removed as they are derived from Greco-Roman 
thought and practice; to do so, moreover, by considering the different sorts 
of frameworks in which antiquity theorized the production and consump-
tion of image-making.11 In interrogating ancient and modern discourses of 
“art history,” our aim is therefore to examine still more fundamental ideas 
about “art” at large—ideas that align with other cultural practices, in other 
cultural media, that are grouped together on the basis of their (assumed) 
related functions, purposes, and effects. Was art ever rationalized as an inde-
pendent sphere of ancient cultural and intellectual life? How did ancient 
modes of discussing the visual arts resemble, employ, and critique discus-
sions of other cultural spheres? And in what ways do ancient constructions 
of art history relate to modern aesthetic frameworks, in particular those 
cultivated in the wake of the Enlightenment?
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12 Foundational here is Foucault 1972, on how categories like “literature,” “politics,” “eco-
nomics,” “art,” and “aesthetics” are modern coinages, “which can be applied to medieval 
culture, or even classical culture, only by a retrospective hypothesis, and by an interplay 
of formal analogies or semantic resemblances” (22).
13 For an excellent survey of the debate, see Ian Morris’ preface to Finley 1999.ix–xxxvi. The 
comparison is developed by both Osborne and Tanner in their respective contributions to 
this volume.
14 The bibliography is enormous, but the essays in Halperin, Winkler, and Zeitlin 1991 still 
provide an excellent guide. The polarized responses to Davidson 2007 demonstrate how 
residual (and ideologized) the debate remains. For the compared historicity of “art history” 
and “sexuality,” see Neer in this volume, as well as Habinek’s contribution (more gener-
ally comparing the universalist-historicist dilemmas of “art” with those of, e.g., “religion” 
and “literature”).
15 The overarching point is made with exemplary clarity by Beard and Henderson 2000.6: 
“Classics is a subject that exists in that gap between us and the world of the Greeks and 
Romans. The questions raised by Classics are the questions raised by our distance from 
‘their’ world, and at the same time by our closeness to it, and by its familiarity to us. In 
our museums, in our literature, languages, culture, and ways of thinking” (emphasis in 
original).
16 The articles are combined and reprinted in Kristeller 1990. An abridged form of the same argu-
ment appears in Kristeller 1997. For a recent reassessment of Kristeller’s achievements (and 
a general hagiography), see Monfasani 2006, especially Labalme 2006. Specifically on the 
postwar context in which (the German) Kristeller was writing, see Elsner in this volume.
A MODERN SYSTEM OF THE ARTS?
Of course, these questions are not particular to modern approaches 
to art, aesthetics, and art history alone.12 The essential problem that we are 
tackling is about the applicability of modern concepts to ancient cultural 
spheres. We might compare, for example, the debate between “primitivist” 
and “modernist” historians of the Greek and Roman economies, in particular 
Moses Finley’s argument about the sociological “embeddedness” of ancient 
as opposed to modern “autonomous” economic systems;13 or else, responding 
to the pioneering work of Michel Foucault, the tussles about the extent to 
which “sexuality” is a meaningful cultural category in antiquity, despite the 
lack of a comparative conceptual vocabulary.14 As in every branch of cultural 
history, the stakes of these debates lie in our negotiation of the simultane-
ous proximity and distance of antiquity—the Greco-Roman world’s peculiar 
capacity to seem familiar and strange to us by alternating degrees.15
In terms of art history, at least, one of the most important attempts 
to tackle these questions was by the German-born, American scholar Paul 
Oskar Kristeller, who published two essays on “the modern system of the 
arts” between 1951 and 1952.16 Kristeller argues that our modern notions 
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17 See, especially, Porter 2009a.15–16, as well as the critiques of Porter and Osborne in this 
volume.
of the “Fine Arts,” conceived in the Enlightenment, do not apply to antiq-
uity or, indeed, to any culture prior to the eighteenth century. Moreover, he 
suggests, such concepts as taste, genius, and the creative imagination were 
nurtured by the Enlightenment and never previously assumed the sorts of 
significance with which they are so readily ascribed today. As subsequent 
critics have pointed out, Kristeller’s thesis is premised upon a conflation of 
weak and strong claims: the argument that the Beaux Arts (as an “irreducible 
nucleus” comprising painting, sculpture, architecture, music, and poetry) 
were invented in the eighteenth century slips into a supposition about the 
eighteenth-century invention of “aesthetic autonomy” at large.17 But within 
Kristeller’s subsequent survey of art criticism through the ages—classical, 
mediaeval, Renaissance, and, finally, during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries (in France, England, and Germany)—Kristeller dedicates some 
nine pages to the “art history” of Greco-Roman antiquity. Antiquity, Kris-
teller claims, never grouped together the five arts of the modern western 
mindset; what is more, Greek and Roman writers “knew no Muse of paint-
ing or of sculpture: they had to be invented by the allegorists of the early 
modern centuries”:
Thus classical antiquity left no systems or elaborate 
concepts of an aesthetic nature, but merely a number of 
scattered notions and suggestions that exercised a lasting 
influence down to modern times but had to be carefully 
selected, taken out of their context, rearranged, reempha-
sised and reinterpreted or misinterpreted before they could 
be utilized as building materials for aesthetic systems. We 
have to admit the conclusion, distasteful to many historians 
of aesthetics but grudgingly admitted by most of them, 
that ancient writers and thinkers, though confronted with 
excellent works of art and quite susceptible to their charm, 
were neither able nor eager to detach the aesthetic quality 
of these works of art from their intellectual, moral, reli-
gious and practical function or content, or to use such an 
aesthetic quality as a standard for grouping the fine arts 
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18 Kristeller 1990.174. As Richard Neer notes in this volume (p.XX), Heidegger reached a 
related conclusion, albeit from a very different starting point—namely, that “the magnifi-
cent art of Greece remains without a corresponding [Greek] cognitive-conceptual medita-
tion on it, such meditation not having to be identical with aesthetics.”
19 Cf. Kristeller 1990.226: “The various arts are certainly as old as human civilization, but 
the manner in which we are accustomed to group them and to assign them a place in our 
scheme of life and culture is comparatively recent.” For an astute commentary, see Porter 
2009a.22.
20 On the subsequent reception of Kristeller’s thesis in the twentieth and twenty-first centu-
ries, see more generally Porter 2009a, esp. 2–4.
21 See Bourdieu 1984, esp. 5–7; cf. Bourdieu 1987.203: “The work of art exists as such . . . 
only if it is apprehended by spectators possessing the disposition and the aesthetic com-
petence which are tacitly required.” 
22 See Eagleton 1990. Compare also Abrams 1989a, esp. 153–58, on Romantic eighteenth-
century notions of aesthetics and their various theological (Pietist) investments.
together or for making them the subject of a comprehen-
sive philosophical interpretation.18
The language of Kristeller’s analysis testifies to the paradox of his 
historicist enquiry: while attempting to eschew the cultural anachronisms 
of “art” and the “aesthetic,” the author cannot help but operate within these 
terms—hence his recourse to “fine arts,” “charm,” “excellent works of art,” 
“aesthetic quality,” etc.19 Kristeller, we might say, articulates precisely the 
“Alma-Tadema effect” with which we began. In highlighting the cultural 
contingency of his own critical framework, however, Kristeller also finds 
himself without an alternative idiom for articulating the history of “art his-
tory” before its supposed invention. Such is the grasp of post- Enlightenment 
aesthetics on our modern western cultural consciousness, it seems, that aban-
doning our rhetoric of art altogether would mean abandoning the project of 
saying anything whatsoever about its prehistory.
It took the epistemological upheavals of the late twentieth cen-
tury to return critics to this paradox.20 Only in the last twenty-five years 
or so have sociologists and cultural historians seriously engaged with the 
larger stakes of Kristeller’s thesis, and in particular, Kristeller’s closing 
speculations about the “causes for the genesis of the system [of aesthetics] 
in the eighteenth century” (1990.225). While Pierre Bourdieu talks of the 
“cultural capital” invested in art since the Enlightenment,21 Terry Eagleton 
draws attention to the social, ethical, and political ideologies that nurtured 
the development of aesthetic enquiry in the eighteenth century (and ever 
since).22 Philosophers and art historians have also responded to Kristeller’s 
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23 Shiner 2001 (quotation, 10); Shiner delivers an impassioned defense of his project, and 
Kristeller’s own, in Shiner 2009. For related attempts to flesh out Kristeller’s historiog-
raphy, associating changing concepts of art and artists with different social, political, and 
economical developments, institutional histories, and technological innovations, see also, 
e.g., Kernan 1990, Berleant 1991, Goehr 1992, Mattick 1993 and 2003, Becq 1994, Wood-
mansee 1994, Mortensen 1997, Williams 2004.7–53. 
24 See Belting 1994. Still more fundamental—at least in German-speaking circles—is Belting 
2001, on the project of what Belting terms “image-anthropology” (Bild-Anthropologie): 
offering a series of new “drafts for a science of the image,” Belting is highly critical of the 
aesthetic assumptions of Kunstgeschichte as traditionally framed (26). The book has had 
a very considerable impact in German scholarship, but much less so in the Anglophone 
world.
25 On the fate of classical art history in the early twenty-first century, especially in English-
speaking lands, see Donohue 2003.4: “The study of ancient art exists in a disciplinary 
no-man’s land. Within art history it holds a marginal position; within textually based dis-
ciplines it is seen as irrelevant; and within many forms of archaeology it is variously con-
demned as effete, exclusive, destructive, or simply lacking validity.” For some overviews 
of the current state of (Anglophone) classical art history, see, e.g., Ridgway 1994, 2005, 
and Kampen 2002 (especially on American scholarship). Compare also Tanner 1994 and 
Elsner 2007a, both mainly concerned with the field as practiced in the UK.
claims, revising and expanding his central thesis—none more so than Larry 
Shiner, whose 2001 monograph on the eighteenth-century “invention” of 
our modern “system of concepts, practices and institutions” for theorizing 
art declared direct inspiration from “Paul Oskar Kristeller’s essays of fifty 
years ago.”23 Others, like Arthur Danto, graft Kristeller’s thesis about the 
eighteenth-century “revolution in art” to their essentialist teleologies of art 
across the ages (1997, esp. 187), while Hans Belting attempts to excavate 
the archaeology of art before its essential invention, situating the para-
digm shift not in the eighteenth century, but rather in the theology of the 
Renaissance.24
Whether or not we accept Kristeller’s hypothesis—and that is 
the underlying question addressed by each of the following articles—the 
stakes of the debate have never been more important, nor more resonant 
across a broad spectrum of different academic fields. Uneasily situated 
in the disciplinary no-man’s land between classics, archaeology, and 
art history, classical art history has witnessed the clamors against tradi-
tional approaches to “art” from each and every corner.25 On one side is 
archaeology, which has made a taboo of “art” in an effort to stave off any 
association between material culture and aesthetic value—an association 
that has long driven an illicit antiquities trade, not least in the Mediterra-
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26 See, e.g., Brodie, Doole, and Watson 2000.12: “Most, if not all, collectors (and some aca-
demics and curators too) regard antiquities as works of art. They argue that regardless of 
their origin they should be put on display for all to see and appreciate—a celebration of 
human artistic genius that transcends time and space . . . Of course, art is in the eye of 
the beholder, but claims of art cannot be allowed to justify destruction and illegal loot-
ing. Many objects marketed as works of art have been ripped from historical buildings 
or monuments”; cf. Brodie, Doole, and Renfrew 2001, Brodie and Tubb 2002, Brodie, 
Kersel, Luke, and Tubb 2006. Other archaeologists have taken their lead from Gell 1998, 
esp. 1–11—an attempt to replace assumptions about “indigenous aesthetics” with a cross-
cultural “anthropological theory of art”: “I think that the desire to see the art of other 
cultures aesthetically tells us more about our own ideology and its quasi-religious venera-
tion of art objects as aesthetic talismans,” as Gell puts it, “than it does about these other 
cultures” (3: note also the summary and response in, e.g., Osborne and Tanner 2007a).
27 Whitley 2001.xxiii. For a much more subtle (though no less programmatic) analysis, see 
Shanks 1996.59–65. Such an approach chimes in particular with the German national tra-
dition of classical archaeology that, having developed independently of klassische Philolo-
gie and antike Geschichte since the late nineteenth century, subsumes classical art history 
under classical archaeology: see below, pp. XX–XX.
28 Gaskell 1991.182 nicely labels the project “retrieval art history,” in which the objective 
is to “interpret visual material as it might have been when it was first made, whether by 
the maker, his contemporaries, or both.” 
29 On the political ideologies underpinning “visual culture,” see Herbert 2003 together with 
the discussions in, e.g., Bryson, Holly, and Moxey 1994, Jencks 1995, Mitchell 1995, and 
Mirzoeff 1999. On these developments and their impact on the study of Greco-Roman art 
history, see Squire 2009.79–87; for two different critical responses, see Neer and Osborne 
in this volume.
30 Cf., e.g., Gilbert-Rolfe 1999, Prettejohn 2005, Scarry 1999, de Bolla 2000, de Bolla 2001.1–
22, Brand 2000, Crowther 2002, Butler 2004, Scruton 2009. Earlier important soundings 
on the same theme include Mothersill 1984, Crowther 1993, and Lyotard 1994. 
nean:26 “all art is material culture . . .” as James Whitley would have us 
insist, “Classical art history therefore is archaeology or it is nothing.”27 
On the other side is art history, which, buffeted by the new historicist 
concerns of cultural historians, has attempted to throw off its tradition of 
connoisseurship, substituting its old-fangled image of elite aestheticism 
with a new historicist breed of “visual culture studies” during the 1990s.28 
It is no coincidence that Kristeller’s historicist account of “art” came to 
be championed at precisely the time when so many departments of “art 
history” metamorphosed into departments of “visual studies.”29 
While the late twentieth century witnessed these increasing clam-
ors for a new mode of “ideology critique,” the early twenty-first has seen a 
slow but sure interest in the sorts of aesthetic frameworks banished only a 
decade ago.30 As Wendy Steiner puts it, invoking the language of “beauty” 
has become a “magnet for the cultural anxieties of our day . . . a way of 
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31 Steiner 2001.xvi, xv. Steiner’s own analysis purports to resurrect a “time when beauty, 
pleasure, and freedom again become the domain of aesthetic experience and art offers a 
worthy ideal for life” (240). 
32 Not least in Alex Nehamas’s recent attempt to abandon the sorts of aesthetic disinterest 
championed by Kant and Schopenhauer in favor of a bodily grounded concept of beauty, 
which Nehamas associates with the classical aesthetics of Plato; see Nehamas 2007.1–35, 
arguing that beauty is “part of the everyday world of purpose and desire, history and con-
tingency, subjectivity and incompleteness” (35). 
33 On the international Philodemus Project, funded by the National Endowment for the 
Humanities, see http://www.humnet.ucla.edu/humnet/classics/philodemus/philhome.htm. 
34 Most notably in Martindale 2005; drawing attention to the aesthetic value of Latin texts, 
Martindale declares that “part of my purpose is to urge fellow classicists to make more 
use of the tradition of philosophical aesthetics from Kant to the present” (3). Martindale’s 
work has caused quite a stir in (historicist) classicist circles: cf., e.g., Farrell 2006.
registering the end of Modernism and the opening of a new period in cul-
ture.”31 Related calls for the reinvention of aesthetics have turned afresh to 
the classical world for inspiration,32 and recent work on Philodemus’s first-
century b.c. treatises on poetics, rhetoric, and music—reconstructed on the 
basis of the carbonized remains from the Villa dei Papiri in Herculaneum—
has added a renewed impetus to such projects.33 What is more, these devel-
opments have seeped back into the agenda of classical studies itself—with 
the exhortation to resist the lures of “culturalism,” for example, and return 
instead to the aesthetic appreciation of Greek and Roman literary texts.34
These tussles about the historical contingency of art and the larger 
role of aesthetics play out still fiercer battles about the future of research 
in the humanities—the ongoing negotiation between the universalizing and 
essentialist narratives of structuralism, on the one hand, and the historical 
relativism that has subsequently come to dominate the academy, on the 
other. It is perhaps understandable that classics, a fundamentally histori-
cist discipline (albeit one with essentialist aspirations), should find itself 
at once so sympathetic to Kristeller’s narrative of rupture and rift, and yet 
simultaneously so reluctant to renounce the “Alma-Tadema effect” with its 
romantic promise of seamless continuity between the ancient and modern 
worlds. The conflicting perspectives of the following articles would cer-
tainly suggest as much. For all their differences in opinion and approach, 
however, our contributors share in the conviction that classical art history 
is uniquely situated to find a way out of the current impasse between histo-
ricizing and essentializing approaches. Moreover, in croaking at each other 
across tiny ponds, and isolating the formal and material study of their sub-
ject from its wider theoretical implications, classical archaeologists have 
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35 For a new translation, see Winckelmann 2006. The classic Anglophone treatment is Potts 
1994, supplemented by the excellent analysis of Pommier 2003. 
36 Preziosi 1998.21–27 insightfully compares Vasari’s and Winckelmann’s conceptual frame-
works and methods.
37 On the relationship between ancient philosophical traditions and Baumgarten’s project of 
aesthetics, see Büttner 2006.9–10.
38 On Kant 1987 and its relation to the work of Lessing (especially Lessing 1984), see the 
bibliography assembled in Squire 2009.49–57, 97–116. 
39 Hegel’s lectures on aesthetics are still best translated by T. M. Knox in Hegel 1975; for 
further discussion and bibliography, see Squire 2009.58–71.
all too often shirked their responsibility to engage with these sorts of mac-
roscopic debates.
In this capacity, it is worth emphasizing that modern systems of 
theorizing the arts, and indeed art history itself, descend directly from the 
study of Greco-Roman material. Whether we trace art history’s origins 
to Joachim Johann Winckelmann and his 1764 Geschichte der Kunst des 
Altertums35 or earlier to Giorgio Vasari (whose Le Vite de’ più eccellenti 
pittori, scultori, e architettori, first published in 1550, was itself modelled 
after a Roman prototype in Pliny’s Natural History),36 classical material has 
always played a classic role in the formation of the discipline. In coining a 
new field of philosophical enquiry between 1750 and 1758—one that dis-
tinguished between the logical knowledge of the mind and the perceptual 
knowledge of the senses—Alexander Gotttlieb Baumgarten deliberately 
turned to ancient Greece to provide a literal etymology for “aesthetics.”37 
Although Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Judgment avoids discussion of 
ancient artworks—in fact, of almost any artistic examples whatsoever—
his conceptual system likewise owes much to Winckelmann and, not 
least, to Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, whose 1766 treatise on Laokoon Oder 
über die Grenzen der Malerei und Poesie is itself framed as a response to 
Winckelmann’s treatise on an ancient classical statue group.38 When lectur-
ing in the 1820s, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel challenged the sorts of 
Schwärmerei implicitly associated with Kant and the Kantian aesthetic; he, 
too, explained the dissolution (Auflösung) of art as an autonomous entity in 
terms of a shift from the classical to the Romantic, positing the Reforma-
tion as the crucial turning point. Hegel, we might say, laid the ground for 
Kristeller’s own mode of historicist critique; once again, though, Hegel’s 
teleological exposé of eighteenth-century aesthetic enquiry was premised 
upon the study of ancient and modern artistic production with a compara-
tive historical perspective.39
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40 Cf. Stewart 2003.10: “One way or another, classical art history has been concerned with 
Roman sculpture as a kind of art, not Roman statuary as a remarkable accumulation of 
objects working in society.” Stewart, however, maintains that “the modern boundaries 
established between portraits, cult images, dedications, and ‘statues-as-art’” pertain “to 
some extent” to antiquity, although they “were not so pronounced as they might seem” 
(17).
41 Cf., e.g., Elsner 1996.526: “Beside this literary world, in which art was really quite pro-
foundly theorized . . . is a world of religious phenomenology, magic and initiation, in many 
ways more familiar from Byzantine and Medieval saints’ lives than from the evolutionary 
art histories of naturalism reproduced by Pliny, Quintilian, and Cicero.” Besides his book-
length treatment of Roman art between the principate and late antiquity (Elsner 1995), some 
of Elsner’s most important contributions to the field are now collected in Elsner 2007b.
The fundamental point is this: whatever its relation to earlier sys-
tems, the eighteenth-century articulation of aesthetics as an autonomous 
field of philosophical enquiry was itself implicated in responses to classical 
precedents. Whether we like it or not, modern discourses of art are bound 
up with Greco-Roman material in the same way that, as Alma-Tadema so 
conspicuously demonstrates, our modes of viewing Greco-Roman “art” are 
themselves inextricable from modern conceptual histories. As a result, it is 
only by comparing and contrasting ancient with modern modes of concep-
tualizing art that we can hope to understand either cultural system—and, 
indeed, both. 
THE “INVENTION OF ART HISTORY”  
IN GRECO-ROMAN ANTIQUITY
Much headway has been made in this direction, not least in recent 
work on the different social, cultural, political, religious, and propagan-
distic functions of Greek and Roman images. In Anglophone scholarship, 
one of the most important contributions came in 1979, with Richard Gor-
don’s seminal article on “Production and Religion in the Graeco-Roman 
World,” in which he expressly contrasted modern aestheticizing agendas 
with ancient theologically grounded modes of theorizing, conceptualizing, 
and interacting with images. Gordon’s article has reverberated in Anglo-
phone scholarship ever since—from Peter Stewart’s important analysis of 
“statues in Roman society,”40 to Jaś Elsner’s various contributions to the 
study of “visuality and subjectivity in Roman art and text” (to cite just two 
British examples).41 
If one takes a broader international perspective, however, it is 
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42 On the specific British and French, as opposed to German, traditions of classical archaeol-
ogy, see, e.g., Snodgrass 2000b and Lissarrague and Schnapp 2000, respectively. This is 
not the place to embark upon an archaeology of classical archaeology, still less to detail 
different national traditions: for some guides, see, e.g., Morris 1994 (focusing on archae-
ologies of Greece), Sichtermann 1996 (on the German tradition), Dyson 2006, especially 
86–132 (a transnational and comparative history of the discipline at the end of the nine-
teenth century).
43 On this German tradition specifically, see, e.g., Hölscher 2000a, esp. 10–14; cf. more 
generally Sichtermann 1996.9–27 and Marchand 1996. Of course, it would be artificial 
to posit too stark a delineation between different national traditions: some of the German 
perspectives explored in this paragraph are just as evident in, e.g., Smith 2002.64–71.
44 Hölscher 2002.13. For other articulations of the same position, see, e.g., Hölscher 2000a.9, 
2000b.156, and, most recently, Ritter 2008.12–13. For a related (but international) vision 
of classical archaeology—espousing that it therefore also has something particular to teach 
departments of art history—see Snodgrass 1987.132.
remarkable to see how different ideologies of “Greco-Roman art” are, in fact, 
shaped by different national traditions of (what we in Britain call) classics, 
classical archaeology, and classical art history.42 In Germany, for example, 
antike Kunstgeschichte (still more antike Bildwissenschaft) is very much 
subsumed within klassische Archäologie. Indeed, since the late nineteenth 
century, klassische Archäologie has evolved as an entirely separate field 
from both klassische Philologie and antike Geschichte.43 Although classical 
material has arguably influenced the modern German artistic tradition more 
than that of any other European country, contemporary German scholar-
ship tends to give a single programmatic answer to the questions explored 
in the current volume. Take, for instance, the words of Tonio Hölscher in 
what has quickly become the foundational German undergraduate textbook 
for the Grundwissen of classical archaeology:
In manchen Ländern wurde sogar an den Universitäten 
eine Trennung von “Kunstgeschichte der Antike” und 
“Klassischer Archäologie” vollzogen. Entsprechend hat 
die Neuere Kunstgeschichte sich von Anbeginn vorwieg-
end mit Werken der “Kunst” befaßt. Diese Trennung von 
“Kunst” und materieller Kultur ist aber eine Erschei-
nung der Neuzeit, die für die Antike nicht gilt. Antike 
“Kunstwerke” waren nicht museale Objekte des Kunst-
genusses, sondern hatten Funktionen im Leben . . . Die-
selben Funktionen wurden z.T. von Gegenständen erfüllt, 
die heute kaum unter den Begriff der “Kunst” fallen.44
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45 On that rhetoric, associated with Adolf Furtwängler in particular, see, e.g., Marvin 2008, 
esp. 137–50 (with further bibliography) and Junker and Stähli 2008 (for a Germanophone 
response). For a much more sensitive (albeit maverick) German reaction to the question of 
Greek and Roman “art,” see Giuliani 2005. On the politicized ideologies at stake in this 
(postwar) German intellectual agenda, even (and perhaps especially) in classical archaeol-
ogy, see Elsner’s contribution to this volume. 
46 For Tanner’s essential argument, see Tanner 2006.12–19, foreshadowed in Tanner 2005.
Some countries have even witnessed a separation between 
“the art history of antiquity” and “classical archaeology” in 
their universities. The “newer art history” has accordingly 
concerned itself from the beginning with works of “art” 
above all else. This separation of art and material culture, 
however, is an invention of modernity: it does not apply 
to antiquity. Ancient “artworks” were not museum objects 
of artistic delight; rather, they had real-life functions . . . 
These functions were partly fulfilled by objects that today 
scarcely have to do with our concept of “art.”
Although he leaves the “countries” unspecified, Hölscher must be thinking 
of the American university system, in which (what he defines as part of) 
classical archaeology is frequently dispatched to departments of art his-
tory. To realize the twenty-first century national ideologies at stake here, 
one only need remember the (to some extent) very different German clas-
sical archaeological tradition of just a century ago. In the larger scale of 
things, it is not very long since German Instituten für klassische Archäolo-
gie proudly employed a much more “artistic” rhetoric of Meisterforschung 
and Kopienkritik—a rhetoric, some might say, that still very much endures, 
despite protestations to the contrary.45
Although keeping an eye on the broader international traditions that 
are at stake, the current volume was conceived in response to one academic 
contribution in particular, one conceived and written in English: Jeremy 
Tanner’s 2006 book on The Invention of Art History in Ancient Greece: 
Religion, Society, and Artistic Rationalisation.46 Tanner brings to what he 
calls the “cultural rationalisation of art” in antiquity an unabashedly socio-
logical approach. Classical art historians, Tanner explains, are faced with 
an uneasy balancing act between primitivist and modernist perspectives: 
on the one side are those historicists who emphasize the radical alterity of 
ancient responses to (what we call) art; on the other are those essentialists 
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47 Cf. Tanner 2006.12–19.
48 See Porter 2009a, esp. 17: “It is for this reason that aesthetic questions are, I believe, 
our best bet for gaining access to the problems of art in antiquity—not because art is the 
ultimate resting point for such an enquiry, but because it represents a relay to something 
else: it is a window onto modes of sensory experience, onto modes of attention generally, 
onto perceptual habits and cognitive styles, and, therefore, onto the social relations that 
are embedded in things.” Porter’s comments form part of a larger enquiry on the “origins 
of aesthetic inquiry in ancient Greece” (see Porter 2010), and chime with comparable 
German projects within the field of classical philosophy (cf., e.g., Büttner 2006.9–12, and 
compare the remarkably interdisciplinary project of Franz 1999).
who, in quite literally approaching art in modern terms, run the risk of col-
lapsing past into present—just like Sir Lawrence Alma-Tadema.47 With his 
firm emphasis on chronological development within antiquity (in particular, 
on the epistemological shifts of the fourth and third centuries b.c.), Tanner 
attempts a comparative sociology that navigates between the primitivist 
and modernist camps: while the specific cultural meanings attributed to art 
collecting and criticism are significantly different between the ancient and 
modern worlds, he argues, they are variant specifications of parallel prac-
tices, marked by a range of family resemblances that render them mutually 
intelligible to each other.
What Tanner offers classical scholarship, as he explains in this 
volume, is a social, political, and intellectual history of image-making 
in antiquity (and beyond it) oriented around the compass of transcultural 
sociological theory. It is an approach that, in some ways, resonates with 
James Porter’s recent championing of ancient aesthetic thinking—his argu-
ment for continuity rather than rift before, during, and after the eighteenth 
century.48 According to Porter, the problem lies not in the broad assimila-
tion of ancient with modern systems of the arts, but rather in the mistaken 
modernist assumption of aesthetic autonomy in the first place: Kristeller’s 
contrived “modern system of the arts” is alien to antiquity, Porter argues, 
because it is also alien to modernity (2009a.13): 
Did the modern system of the arts, in the form that Kris-
teller wants us to imagine it, ever exist at all? I believe 
it did not, because that system is a historical construct 
that has been put together by Kristeller himself, one that 
is all the trickier in that it is exemplified perfectly by no 
one, but is instead elaborated through a series of fleeting 
cameos . . . It looks as if there was in fact no canonical 
148 Michael Squire
49 Tanner 2006.302. It is the ambiguous “rather purely” of Tanner’s formulation with which 
Porter would take issue; for Tanner’s own response to Porter’s approach, see below, pp. 
XX–XX.
50 For some introductory comments on the painting, see Havelock 1995.86–88; cf. also Over-
beck 1868, who collects Greek and Latin sources, along with Bergmann 1995.89, n. 20 
(with detailed bibliography).
51 See LIMC 2.1.54–57, s.v. “Aphrodite,” nos. 423–55. The painting was famous enough to 
serve as an ecphrastic subject in the fifth book of Quintus of Smyrna’s Post-Homerica 
(Quintus Smyrnaeus 5.69–72) and as a tableau to be imitated by Byrrhena in Apuleius’s 
Metamorphoses (Met. 2.17).
“nucleus,” but only a loosely defined and ever-chang-
ing grab-bag of items that fell under the newly discov-
ered rubric of “fine arts” during this era (emphasis in 
original).
There are important differences between Tanner’s sociological model, with 
its concern with strict historical development, and Porter’s essential (and 
wholly more essentialist) emphasis on perception and experience, grounded 
in the study of lesser-known Greek critical texts. But the thrust of Porter’s 
argument generally concurs with Tanner’s conclusion about the “invention 
of art history” in ancient Greece; as Tanner puts it, “The final outcome of 
this process of cultural rationalisation [in antiquity] was the production of 
art with a rather purely aesthetic and art-historical orientation, primarily for 
connoisseurs and collectors.”49
Whatever else we make of Kristeller’s arguments—or the subse-
quent responses to them—there are very conspicuous differences between 
ancient and modern discourses of “aesthetics.” The question, we might say, 
is why the notion of aesthetic autonomy established itself in the eighteenth 
century (or why it has been so vehemently challenged in the twentieth and 
twenty-first). Perhaps better, we might ask ourselves why these concepts 
did not take root in the Greco-Roman world—at least to the same extent, 
or in the same sorts of ways. 
Perhaps an example can best clarify what we mean here: the paint-
ing of Aphrodite Anadyomene attributed to the fourth-century Greek painter 
Apelles.50 As with almost every other renowned painting and statue from 
antiquity, Apelles’ actual work is lost, known to us only through literary 
texts and a series of later visual imitations.51 Five poems are dedicated to 
the painting in the Planudean Anthology (Anth. Plan. 178–82), translating 
the image into the conventional language of Greek ecphrastic epigram. 
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52 Worked with “the most polished craftsmanship” (politissima arte), as Cicero had earlier 
claimed (ad Fam. 1.9.15).
But the most detailed discussion of the painting comes in Pliny the Elder’s 
Natural History amid a longer discussion of Apelles and his oeuvre (HN 
35.91–92): 
Uenerem exeuntem e mari diuus Augustus dicauit in delu-
bro patris Caesaris, quae anadyomene uocatur, uersibus 
Graecis tali opere dum laudatur, aeuis uicta, sed inlustrata. 
cuius inferiorem partem corruptam qui reficeret non potuit 
reperiri, uerum ipsa iniuria cessit in gloriam artificis. con-
senuit haec tabula carie, aliamque pro ea substituit Nero 
in principatu suo Dorothei manu. Apelles inchoauerat et 
aliam Uenerem Coi, superaturus etiam illam suam pri-
orem. inuidit mors peracta parte, nec qui succederet operi 
ad praescripta liniamenta inuentus est. 
[Apelles’] “Venus Rising from the Sea,” known as the 
Anadyomene, was consecrated by the divine Augustus in 
the temple of his father Caesar: it is a work which has been 
celebrated in certain Greek poems which, though they have 
outlived the painting, have perpetuated its fame. When 
the lower part of the picture became damaged, no one 
could be found to repair it; but the very damage that the 
picture sustained thereby added to the glory of the artist. 
Time and damp at last effaced the painting, and, during 
his reign, Nero had it replaced by a copy, painted by the 
hand of Dorotheus. Apelles also began work on another 
Venus, this time for Cos, which would have outshone even 
the former painting. But death invidiously prevented its 
completion, nor could anyone be found to complete the 
work according to its prescribed outline.
As a symbol of consummate artistic skill,52 and a challenge to 
posterity, the Anadyomene, at least as conceptualized by Pliny, might seem 
wholly familiar within our own modern modes of art history in the twenty-
first century. The painting, after all, was highly prized and subject to the 
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53 As Mack 2005.86 puts it of Renaissance engagements with the painting, “what even the 
mighty Romans could not restore, their worthy successors, the Florentines, through Bot-
ticelli, could recreate.” 
54 More generally on the remove of Pliny’s text from modern concepts of art history, see the 
important comments in Gordon 1979.7.
55 Compare Pliny’s comments on Myron’s bronze statue of a cow, “famous for the renowned 
poems that celebrate it” (celebratis uersibus laudata, HN 34.57).
56 Strabo 14.2.19 describes the original purpose of the object in the temple at Cos as a “votive 
offering” (anathêma), adding that the painting “of the female founder of his family” was 
subsequently dedicated by Augustus in honor of his father. In return for the painting, the 
ravages of time (foreshadowing the sorts of Romantic narratives so preva-
lent in the early nineteenth century). This is presumably the reason why 
a certain Dorotheus later restored (indeed, replaced) the image; or why, 
even in Apelles’ own lifetime, the island of Cos commissioned a second, 
related image. Most striking, however, is the way in which the history of the 
painting is here collapsed into the history of its creator: Pliny structures his 
narrative around the virtuoso dealings of its maker—the masterful Apelles, 
whose prodigy no other painter could repair or, in the case of the second 
painting, complete in accordance with its original prescribed master plan 
(praescripta liniamenta). These sorts of anecdotal asides may seem in keep-
ing with more modern art-historical modes, themselves derived, at least in 
part, from the very model that Pliny bequeathed to us. Viewed through the 
lens of Renaissance imitations—Botticelli’s Birth of Venus, Titian’s Venus 
Anadyomene, or Antonio Lombardo’s bas-relief, each of which has spurred 
countless imitations of its own—Apelles’ Anadyomene can function as an 
objet d’art par excellence.53
But the Natural History simultaneously suggests that Apelles’ 
Anadyomene led multiple lives, even when Pliny was writing some four 
centuries after its creation.54 Certainly, the image constitutes a celebrated 
example of painterly mastery. And yet it is also a source of poetic inspira-
tion for a series of “Greek poems” that have outlived the painting and, fur-
thermore, now “bring it to light” (inlustrata).55 Dedicated at the center of an 
Augustan civic building program and within a temple complex dedicated to 
Julius Caesar, this object takes on other roles besides: we are dealing with 
(a painting of) a goddess apprehended in the sacred context of a temple; a 
commodified piece of booty transferred from Greece to Rome in an act of 
imperial appropriation and, in its new Roman cultic context, with an allu-
sion to the divine ancestry of the Julio-Claudians, guided by the generative 
auspices of Venus herself. 56 The painting’s context, and therefore its sig-
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Coans purportedly received a remission in Roman tribute of 100 talents. On the political 
stakes at play here, see Pollitt 1978.166–67. Bergmann 1995.89 suggests that it was this 
painting that Nero coveted for private display in his Domus Aurea—and that Vespasian 
subsequently restored to public view in the Temple of Peace (Suet. Vesp. 18).
57 On the poems, see, especially, Gutzwiller 2002.102–04. For an analysis of the “eva-
sive epiphanies” staged by epigrams on both the Knidian Aphrodite and the Aphrodite 
Anadyomene, see Platt 2002b, esp. 35, and Platt forthcoming, chapter four. 
nificance, vacillates (un)easily between that of temple, picture gallery, and 
victory monument: any attempt to write an “art history” of the Anadyomene 
must take account of those various religious, political, and cultural roles 
whereby the status of the object veers between the comfortably familiar 
and the radically other. 
Many of these themes are explored in the epigrammatic treatment 
of the painting. The adulation of (the image of) Aphrodite Anadyomene—so 
beautiful that even Athena and Hera would concede her supremacy (Anth. 
Plan. 178, 181, 182)—operates alongside and through associated discourses 
of visual epiphany. What is more, those discourses themselves infringe upon 
ecphrastic epigram’s own meta-literary concern with manifesting and occlud-
ing that visual image through these verbal poems: the enargeia involved in 
experiencing the epiphanic appearance of the painted goddess, made at once 
present and absent by means of Apelles’ artistic mediation, becomes a fig-
ure for the complex representational status of a painted image that is itself 
represented through epigrammatic language—for the promise and failure 
of ecphrastically turning images into words.57 Apelles, claims Archias, saw 
the naked Aphrodite herself, just as she was born from the sea, laying bare 
(in every sense) his apparition through the act of drawing her naked (Anth. 
Plan. 179.1–3). According to Julian of Egypt, Apelles’ creative midwifery 
stands in comparison with the ocean that originally bore the goddess, render-
ing the sea’s original birth of Aphrodite through the liquidity of paint (Anth. 
Plan. 181.1–2). In another variant, Democritus draws attention to the (im)
propriety of viewing a naked divinity in the first place (Anth. Plan. 180.5), 
returning to the dominant topos of associated epigrams on the Knidian Aph-
rodite, with their conflation of original prototype and mimetic replication 
(cf. Anth. Plan. 159–72). To be sure, these poems monumentalize the technê 
of the artist: so convincing is Apelles’ painting, as one epigram has it, that 
viewers should step away from it “so as not to be splashed by the foam that 
drips from her locks as she wrings them” (Anth. Plan. 181.4–5). By doing 
so, however, the epigrams also stage concerns about the  performance of this 
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58 See Platt 2002b.40: “Yet while the Anadyomene series is ostensibly about visual creativ-
ity, the absorption of such a motif into the literary medium of the epigram turns it into a 
reflection on the technê of the poet himself, and the literary genesis of the text; it is ulti-
mately verbal technê which has power over the reader” (emphasis in original).
59 As in so many other ecphrastic epigrams, the use of empsychos here relates to a burgeon-
ing Hellenistic bibliography on the philosophy of vision founded upon a Socratic concern 
with rendering the invisible soul visible (cf. Xen. Mem. 3.10.3). At the same time, Leoni-
das (like so many other Greek writers, regardless of their specific chronology) capitalizes 
on the established pun that inheres in the verb graphein, relating to the acts both of writ-
ing and drawing (cf., e.g., Lissarrague 1992, Boeder 1996.149–65, and Männlein-Robert 
2007).
60 On the painting from the Casa della Venere in Conchiglia, Pompeii II.3.3, see PPM 3: 
140–42, nos. 45–48.
61 For a related example of the way in which Pompeian wall painting could conflate differ-
ent viewing modes, collapsing modern art-historical categories of the secular and sacred, 
see Platt 2002a.
evasive epiphany, at once performed—and evaded—through the technê of 
language:58 in representing the desirous beauty of Aphrodite, writes Leoni-
das of Tarentum, Apelles figured her “not painted, but alive” (οὐ γραπτόν, 
ἀλλ᾿ ἔμψυχον, Anth. Plan. 182.4).59
The Anadyomene played shifting roles within shifting literary 
genres, many of them culturally removed from our own modes of con-
ceptualizing what the “artwork” is—the ontology of the image, as it were. 
The role ascribed to Apelles in the process can lull us into a false sense 
of security about ancient concepts of the artist—the talented “Old Master” 
praised for both his epiphanic (in)sight and technical prowess. But when 
we encounter imitations of the painting in an Ostian bath complex or in a 
Pompeian peristyle (figure 2), it is worth remembering that this “artwork” 
could mobilize that full range of interrelated discourses, and others besides:60 
a nod to classicizing tastes, certainly, but the iconography might also spur 
reflection on associated ideas of cultural ownership, artistic illusionism, and 
the potential theological dangers that inhere in the act of seeing (and what 
is more, of being seen to see).61 Behind the resemblances between ancient 
and modern modes of art history, in other words, is a world of difference. 
And it is here that the dangers of anachronism most conspicuously lurk.
BUT IS IT ART . . . ? EIGHT DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES
In engaging with these broad themes, this volume has a concep-
tual archaeology of its own: it derives from a panel held under the joint 
auspices of the American Philological Association and the Archaeological 
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Institute of America, as part of their combined annual meetings at Philadel-
phia in January 2009. Following the acceptance of the organizer-refereed 
panel in March 2007, the editors issued an open call for papers, receiving 
a remarkable number of abstracts from a formidable array of specialists. In 
the review of abstracts that followed, we tried to strike a balance between 
different disciplinary perspectives—visual, material, philological, literary, 
cultural historical, philosophical, and those grounded in reception studies. In 
particular, we privileged contributions that dealt with the cross-fertilization 
of these different approaches: papers that reconciled variables of category, 
geography, and chronology in innovative ways, for example, or that explored 
how architecture, sculpture, and painting themselves embodied, flaunted, 
and critiqued, contemporary, verbally mediated cultural discourses. 
Although the current volume maintains the integrity of that origi-
nal conference panel, we have made three significant alterations. First, as 
a consequence of the rich discussions that followed, we commissioned two 
additional papers, one by Richard Neer (focusing on archaic and classical 
material) and the other by one of the editors, Verity Platt (on the intersec-
tion between Hellenistic discourses of visuality and cult practice). Second, 
we altered the order of papers, placing Jeremy Tanner’s paper at the end 
rather than at the beginning of the proceedings and inviting him to address 
some of the post-paper debates. Third, and finally, we invited Jaś Elsner to 
act as an independent respondent, bringing together the different themes of 
the volume in a concluding envoi. 
We begin with James Porter, who delivers a sustained meditation 
on ancient and modern systems of conceptualizing the arts while pointing 
to the longue durée that stretches between them. What is perhaps most 
distinctive about Porter’s approach is its inter-medial perspective, recon-
structing a discourse of the arts that unites visual culture with the likes of 
poetry, music, and dance.62 The root questions of aesthetics remain valid 
within the study of classical antiquity, Porter argues, so long as we strip 
down our own (mis)understandings of the term—in particular, the mistaken 
 assumption of aesthetic autonomy. As Porter explains, this means aban-
doning the  dogmatic historicism epitomized by the work of Paul Oskar 
Kristeller; but it also means searching for theories of relative autonomy, 
both in ancient texts (Plato, Aristotle, and the Hellenistic euphronists), and 
in foundational modern treatises (among “Kant and his peers”). In this 
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63 See Shiner 2001.19–27, and compare Shiner 2009—an equally impassioned rebuttal of 
Porter’s position.
64 Although coming to the subject from the different perspective of ancient critical texts, 
Porter’s position very much resonates with dominant twentieth-century paradigms within 
classical archaeology: cf., e.g., Robertson 1991.2–3: “A verbal distinction between ‘craft’ 
and ‘art’ was never made in antiquity, nor in the Middle Ages or early Renaissance; not, 
I think, before the early sixteenth century. That the distinction was not verbalized must 
mean that it was not clearly thought out; but that something had existed, for ages before 
the verbal distinction was made, on to which we can properly extrapolate our conception 
of ‘art’ seems to me absolutely certain. Mediaeval and Renaissance painting and sculpture 
certainly qualify, and so does sculpture (and painting too, only so little of it survives) in 
ancient Greece.” Robertson’s position very much endures among a number of Anglophone 
classical art historians in the twenty-first century: compare, e.g., Stewart 2008.2–3, com-
plaining that to talk of Roman “visual culture” or “visual history” runs “the risk of throwing 
out the baby with the bath water. They leave an art-shaped hole in the historical discourse. 
So far as I am concerned, ‘art’ it is. And art history this is” (3). (For Stewart’s image of 
the baby in his bath water, in a precisely analogous context, see Robertson 1991.1.)
way, the ancient critical tradition can actually shed light on the modern, 
highlighting the artificiality of such overarching categories and revealing 
the fabrication of “modernist” myths of aesthetic autonomy. To be clear, 
Porter does not deny historical difference, but rather takes issue with the 
ideologically grounded assumption of incommensurability. While cultural 
philosophers like Larry Shiner maintain that “the Greeks had no word for 
it,”63 Porter would claim that art existed before its labelling as such, just as 
gravity existed before Newton was hit on the head by an apple. Baumgar-
ten’s coinage of “aesthetics,” in short, owes more to its Greek conceptual 
history than its Greek etymology alone.64 If, as cultural historians, we posit 
too large a chasm between the ancient and modern worlds, there can be no 
getting across; worse still, Porter warns, we will end up denying the fun-
damental continuities in human sentience that bridge the historical divide 
between past and present. 
The enduring tension between aestheticism and historicism is also 
the subject of Richard Neer’s paper. Interrogating a Francophone tradition 
of cultural history, Neer exposes the assumptions that continue to inform 
scholarly attempts at rationalizing and excluding aesthetic judgment: on the 
one hand, he argues, traditional art-historical methods have depended upon 
the logical priority of a concept of style; on the other, modern modes that 
privilege “visual culture” have attempted to uncover “viewing experiences” 
in isolation from aesthetic preconceptions, thus importing the ideological 
(and anachronistic) assumptions of the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
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65 The foundational analysis here is Elsner 2000 (revised as 2007b.1–26). Analyzing the 
interchange between ancient aestheticizing attitudes to the image, on the one hand (the 
“concomitant fascination with the sheer artistry of art” [Elsner 2007b.3]), and ancient ritu-
alizing approaches, on the other (the “culture of sacred images and ritual-centred view-
ing,” 3), Elsner points to the “dynamic spectrum of interchanging visualities that appear to 
have existed in a permanent dialectic and that could manifest together in the same viewer” 
(25). 
66 Cf. below, p. XX, n. XX.
centuries. Turning to Jean-Pierre Vernant’s analysis of archaic Greek image-
making and patterns of semiosis as his paradigmatic example, Neer suggests 
that, for all its importance and influence, Vernant’s approach risks sidelining 
the visual realm altogether, collapsing material examples into oversimpli-
fied cultural paradigms of theorizing representation. By way of corrective, 
Neer implies that language, stylistic analysis, and archaeological contextu-
alization can work together to generate a historicized “phenomenology” of 
the image in which the mobilization of visual effect and response allows 
us to develop a still newer mode of “new classical art history”—one that 
reconciles traditional formalism and connoisseurship with modern critical 
modes of cultural analysis.
In some ways, Verity Platt’s paper on the aesthetics of the sacred 
in the Hellenistic world begins where Neer’s study of archaic and classi-
cal phenomenology leaves off. Despite the avowed—indeed overtly mili-
tant—secularism of the twenty-first-century academy, religious experience 
remained fundamental to Greek and Roman concepts of (what we deem) 
the art object. Even the most sophisticated critics of Greco-Roman visual 
culture rely on too stark a contrast between “sacred” and “aesthetic” modes 
of viewing, Platt argues.65 What is more, this has been at the cost of a wholly 
false dichotomy in modern art-historical scholarship whereby certain (archaic 
and classical) groups of objects are treated in terms of a supposed “ritual” 
function, while others (especially from the Hellenistic and Roman periods) 
become the subject of a differentiated mode of “connoisseurial” (and hence 
sociological and political) interpretation. In art history, as in so many other 
spheres, classicists have appropriated the ragbag category of the “Hellenis-
tic” as way of assimilating the ancient to the modern.66 So it is, for example, 
that while Tanner has recourse to religion in explaining the development 
of naturalism in archaic and classical Greece, his complex analysis of the 
“rationalization of art” might be said to downplay the continued importance 
of theology, ascribing to religion an all too minimal role in the “reasonable 
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67 See Tanner 2006.205–76; for Tanner’s response to this criticism, see below, pp. 
XX–XX.
68 Contrast, for example, the highly aestheticizing perspective of Kousser 2008.141–42 (unwit-
tingly perpetuating, e.g., Tanner 2006.226–33), who concludes as follows of the Athena 
Parthenos “copy” in the Pergamene Mouseion: “In so far as a particularized meaning for 
the Athena Parthenos existed in such ensembles, it was more likely as a ‘fine art repro-
duction’ than as a religious or political symbol.”
69 For the larger demonstration of the point, see Platt forthcoming. On our own modern 
western “theologies of viewing,” forged during the Reformation and removed from earlier 
thought and practice, see Squire 2009.1–193.
70 The foundational text here is perhaps the special issue of the Journal for Consciousness 
Studies that focused on “art and the brain” (Goguen 1999), especially the contributions 
by V. S. Ramachandran and William Hirstein, and by Semir Zeki. 
ways of looking at pictures” that dominated Hellenistic Greece and Rome.67 
As Platt contends, and as Apelles’ Anadyomene so clearly shows, religious 
experience continued to define cultural attitudes to what modern scholars 
have over simplistically deemed objets d’art—whether statues in the library, 
ecphrastic performances in Alexandrian texts, or epigraphic inventories of 
objects displayed in the temple.68 If we are to understand what the image 
was in the ancient world—once again, its ontology—we cannot afford to 
overlook the implications of viewing it with questions about religion, devo-
tion, and epiphany: where modern art history, almost by definition, privi-
leges secular approaches, the ancient world surrounded the image in an 
ever-expanding concatenation of theological significance.69 
Religion is one of the many comparanda that Thomas Habinek 
brings to bear on his “naturalist” account of aesthetics. As a cultural his-
torian acutely interested in social anthropology, evolutionary studies, and 
cognitive psychology, Habinek sets to work on “ancient art” with a truly 
interdisciplinary conceptual toolbox. From the combined perspectives of 
neuroscience and anthropology, Habinek argues, “art” can be compared 
to all manner of other cultural phenomena that are at once intrinsic to our 
human evolutionary makeup, but also socially determined by the specific 
contingencies in which that blueprint finds distinct cultural expression.70 
Habinek’s contribution is characteristically provocative, adding its own 
essentialist take to the transhistorical conclusions of James Porter and Jer-
emy Tanner in particular: “‘art,’” as he concludes, “is a secure category 
that can be defended on both evidentiary and theoretical grounds without 
dependence on notions of a fixed, universal subjectivity, or ideological 
privileging of one set of historical practices or one historical period over 
another” (p. XX). 
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71 For Habinek, though, this universal story intensifies rather than diminishes the need for 
historical specificity: the faculty of perception demonstrates the reciprocal relationship 
between mind and environment. 
72 For an English translation, see Kris and Kurz 1979; on the specific Christian Pietist under-
pinnings of modern Romantic concepts of the artist, see Mason 1993.225–33 and Tanner, 
pp. XX, in this volume.
73 Most obviously in the attribution of Greek vase-painting, ascribing individual objects to 
known or supposed “artists.” The approach is indebted to the work of Sir John Beazley in 
particular, but it is in fact derived from an earlier tradition of connoisseurship, especially 
Giovanni Morelli’s attributions of Renaissance paintings. For discussions of the ideological 
One of the issues that Habinek’s article raises—returning to a 
theme already suggested by Richard Neer—is that images have the sem-
blance of being universally interpretable. Unless he has knowledge of the 
original language (and the particular conventions of its presentation), “Joe 
Public” would probably not head to the library to read a Greek papyrus, and 
yet the crowds that frequent museums of antiquities attest to the fact (or at 
least widespread assumption) that material objects can communicate across 
removes of chronology, geography, and cultural perspectives—furthermore, 
that visual imagery can do so in a way that verbal language cannot. Whether 
or not to call this innate sensibility an “aesthetic” depends, as Habinek 
contends, on exactly what we mean by the term: our broad and conflicting 
definitions of aesthetics in the twenty-first century have to do with the par-
ticularities of our own post-Enlightenment perspectives. But so long as we 
concentrate on the faculty of perception itself, there is a universal—and in 
every sense, essential—story to be told.71 In historicist terms, moreover, we 
can find an archaeology for such phenomenologies of perception, reason, 
and materiality in Greek and Roman Stoic philosophy. 
If Habinek ends by discussing highfalutin ancient philosophical 
texts, Robin Osborne returns to the nitty-gritty of ancient material produc-
tion, focusing on the perceived role of the artist in archaic, classical, and 
Hellenistic Greek culture. Ever since Ernst Kris and Otto Kurz’s ground-
breaking 1931 work Legend, Myth, and Magic in the Image of the Artist, 
critics have shown how modern, western understandings of art are themselves 
the product of a certain conception of the artist—as heroic creator, inspired 
genius, indeed, even mediator of the Holy Spirit.72 Classical archaeology 
has very much tended to operate within these terms, privileging prosopo-
graphies of Masters and Master workshops, even when their names have 
been lost (or rather, perhaps, never widely known).73 While literary texts and 
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stakes, see, e.g., Elsner 1990, Vickers and Gill 1994.1–32, Shanks 1996.37–41,  Whitley 
1997 (with response in Oakley 1998), Rouet 2001.1–24. This sort of prosopographic 
commitment to “personal styles” is to be found in virtually all other branches of classical 
archaeology, not least in the study of Greek sculpture: see, e.g., Palagia and Pollitt 1996 
and Corso 2004–07 (a two-volume project dedicated to the “art of Praxiteles”); compare 
also Richardson 2000, on the supposed “identifiable figure painters” working in Campa-
nia, and Getz-Gentle 2001 (applying a similar strategy to the “personal styles” of much 
earlier Cycladic sculpture). Vollkommer 2001–04 arguably offers only the culmination of 
this overarching academic obsession. 
74 For some introductory comments on the problem of writing “a history of art without art-
ists,” see, e.g., Osborne 1998.9–21 (on archaic and classical Greek material), along with 
Stewart 2008.10–38 (on Roman objects). Specifically on the artists of the Ara Pacis, see 
Conlin 1997, with response in, e.g., Claridge 1999.
75 In this sense, Osborne’s work builds upon that of François Lissarrague in particular: see 
Lissarrague 1985, 1990, 1992, and 1999; compare also Osborne and Pappas 2007. 
76 Foundational, once again, is Kristeller 1990, on the absence of any ancient distinction 
between “artist” and “craftsman” (170–71), and the full spectrum of meanings encompassed 
by the Greek term technê and the Latin word ars (166); cf. also Shiner 2001.22–24. On 
Greek artists specifically, see Stewart 1979.101–14: “That the Greeks had no word for 
‘art’ or ‘artist’ has clearly little or no bearing on the problem at hand, for the appearance 
of the artist as an autonomous creator well after the codification of Greek terminology for 
the arts was simply the result of an historical accident” (111).
inscriptions have passed down the names of many ancient image-makers and 
their works—as in the case of Apelles’ Anadyomene—the historical factors 
influencing the recognition and suppression of artistic agency varies wildly 
according to time and place: that we know the names of so many Attic pot-
ters and vase-painters but none of the craftsmen who carved the Ara Pacis, 
for example, hardly maps onto post-Enlightenment concepts of the role and 
status of the artist.74 As Osborne demonstrates, moreover, Greek artists’ 
signatures (like other inscriptions) retained a performative function that, 
in many senses, is quite alien to that familiar from the post-Enlightenment 
western world: rather than turn objects into autonomous “art” objects, sig-
natures “did” things in and for specific social contexts.75
Many scholars have dealt with the question of the artist’s status in 
antiquity.76 In his contribution, though, Osborne looks not to Roman imperial 
texts—to Pliny, Quintilian, or Pausanias—but rather to the archaeological 
record itself. Through a quantitative epigraphic survey of “artistic” signa-
tures from archaic through classical Greek culture, Osborne demonstrates 
that there was no qualitative development in the history of signing objects 
between the sixth and the fourth centuries b.c.: there was no “rise of the 
artist” in the fourth century, as Osborne puts it, because the artist never 
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77 As such, Osborne most conspicuously challenges the narrative framework of Tanner 
2006.141–204 (rearticulated in Tanner 2005.185–90), as well as some of the assumptions 
latent in Neer 2002, esp. 87–134.
78 One might well contrast Lapatin’s highly politicized interest here with the aestheticizing 
perspective of Tanner 2006.264–75, concerned with a much more “rationalist culture of 
viewing”—with how “settings . . . served to inculcate a rationalist sensibility, congruent 
with the cultural patterning of elite philosophical and rhetorical culture” (265).
arose.77 Osborne’s paper attempts something still all too rare among classical 
archaeologists: it studies the evidence of Greek vase-painting alongside that 
of Greek sculpture. In doing so, however, Osborne also returns us to some 
of the fundamental tensions with which this introduction began. On the one 
hand, his alien characterization of the classical artist might seem to align 
him with primitivist rather than modernizing approaches to Greco-Roman 
art history. On the other, Osborne explains this historical particularity in 
unabashedly modernizing terms: Greek artists, he posits, were concerned 
not with making themselves visible, but rather with enhancing the aesthetic 
appearance of the object (“denying that ceramic vessels are or can be works 
of art makes no sense,” p. XX).
Inscriptions are also one of the sources introduced by Ken Lapatin, 
whose paper addresses the repatriation of objects in antiquity. As curator 
of one of the largest and most fiercely contested American collections of 
antiquities, Lapatin knows only too well the idealism that belies modern 
western notions of “aesthetic disinterest”—that our peculiar investment in 
aesthetics forms part of a much larger set of discourses about cultural prop-
erty, ownership, and heritage. And yet, Lapatin demonstrates, these debates 
were themselves paralleled in antiquity—as again witnessed in the example 
of the Aphrodite Anadyomene: in the ancient and modern worlds alike, art 
histories are forged around analogous issues of national and civic iden-
tity, political self-aggrandizement, and the workings of comparable tourist 
industries. There are always competing narratives about an object’s value. 
Lapatin’s conclusions chime with some of Margaret Miles’ recent work 
(2008) about art as plunder in the Roman world, with her literary focus 
on Cicero’s Verrine Orations. For our purposes, though, Lapatin takes us 
quite literally beyond the aesthetic, exposing parallel social concerns, cul-
tural institutions, and political practices that continue to inform art history 
in both ancient and modern perspectives.78
It is fitting that Jeremy Tanner, whose 2006 book on the Inven-
tion of Art History in Ancient Greece supplied its initial impetus, should 
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79 It is worth noting, however, that Tanner’s particular focus on the Hellenistic as the key 
moment of cultural rift is by no means new, at least among classical philologists. Recent 
analyses of Hellenistic literary and visual cultures have tended to offer closely related nar-
ratives (especially in the context of ecphrastic epigram): cf., e.g., Goldhill 1994.205: “[In 
the Hellenistic world] the culture of viewing is constructed—in part at least—in and by 
a series of written responses to works of art . . . Hellenistic culture is where ‘art history’ 
as a discipline first develops—with all the implications of that for the relations between a 
viewer and art” (rearticulated in Goldhill 2007.2); Männlein-Robert 2007.10: “Sie [Bilder 
und Artefakte] werden als reine Kunstwerke verhandelt” (cf. also the more nuanced phras-
ing of Rouveret 1989.461). This philological framework, in fact, stretches back to much 
earlier scholarship on “Hellenistic art and poetry”: see, e.g., Webster 1964.157 on how Cal-
limachus’s descriptions of artworks “reflect the beginning of scholarship in the history of 
art” (or compare the much more subtle and sophisticated analysis of Onians 1979.53–94). 
For some preliminary resistance to this model, though, see Platt in this volume, along with 
Squire 2009.241–49.
80 Cf., e.g., Tanner 2006.300–01, together with, e.g., Tanner 2007.
provide the last contribution before Jaś Elsner’s response. Tanner offers a 
concise rearticulation of his comparative sociological approach to Greco-
Roman art history, clarifying his position in the light of the volume’s other 
contributions (especially those of Platt, Porter, and Osborne). His method, 
Tanner explains, takes from Talcott Parsons a theory of “expressive symbol-
ism” and “comparative differentiation,” while deriving a model of “cultural 
rationalization” from the work of Max Weber in particular. Tanner keeps 
one eye on the macro-scale of ancient-modern comparisons and the other 
on the micro-scale of chronological change within each specific time frame: 
his particular method is to relate the Greek “rationalization” of art to other 
social, cultural, political, economic, religious, and, institutional developments 
between the late classical and Hellenistic periods.79 The discourses of art 
history that emerged in the Greek world, Tanner explains, share fundamental 
structural similarities with those that developed in the western world between 
the late fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, themselves founded upon ancient 
paradigms. What is more, such family resemblances should encourage us to 
compare “art histories” from other, non-western cultures—not least those of 
ancient China.80 Tanner therefore seeks a compromise between primitivist 
and modernist approaches, subtly differentiating his account, for example, 
from Porter’s: as he explains, different social, cultural, and (especially) 
institutional contexts—the Greek polis, the Renaissance humanist court, and 
eighteenth-century Pietist theology—imposed different limits (and afforded 
different opportunities) for developing different degrees of artistic autonomy 
at different times and places. 
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81 Such a project would give a much more complicated and uneven history of ancient “art” 
criticism than is often assumed: compare, for example, how Bertrand 1881.53–54 argues 
concerning his Imagines that “one day Philostratus had a new idea [une pensée neuve], 
and on that day created a genre that outlived him and inspired imitators: he created art 
criticism [il créa la critique d’art].” 
Jaś Elsner ends the volume by returning—characteristically—to 
the bigger picture. Situating our discussions within a much longer art-
historiographic perspective, Elsner demonstrates the different ideological 
investments at play in each and every one of the volume’s various contri-
butions: when it comes to questions of art and aesthetics, as indeed to any 
other sphere of intellectual enquiry, “the stakes are always in part philo-
sophical and theoretical, and never wholly empirical” (p. XX). As Elsner 
concludes, such “presentism” is itself a historical phenomenon: from the 
very beginnings of the discipline—whether we look to the Germanophone 
precedents of Winckelmann, Lessing, Kant, Herder, Schopenhauer, Hegel, 
or to the more immediate ancestry of Riegl, Wölfflin, Sedlymayr, Gombrich, 
and, yes, of Kristeller himself—art history has always been forged from the 
intersection of ancient materials with modern ideologies. There is always 
a story of continuity to be told, in other words, just as there is always also 
a potential narrative of rift. Elsner’s own story of historicist particularity, 
no less than essentialist universality, consequently gets to the heart of the 
epistemological challenges of understanding art—in whatever terms. 
The following eight papers bring together a spectrum of different 
disciplinary outlooks, relating ancient to modern vocabularies of sensation, 
perception, and phenomenology, while exploring the associated political, 
social, and theological practices that these imply. Certain subjects are, of 
course, underrepresented, and other objects and texts are almost entirely 
overlooked—an inevitable consequence of our broadly defined remit. There 
remains scope, for example, for homing in on variables of genre, space, 
and time—whether to form a more unified narrative of linear chronological 
development or to complicate that chronological focus by comparing and 
contrasting art-historical modes across different literary forms (Hellenistic 
epigram, Vitruvius’s On Architecture, Quintilian’s Institutes of Oratory, 
Pliny’s Natural History, Pausanias’s Description of Greece, Dio Chrys-
ostom’s Twelfth Olympic Oration, Philostratus’s Imagines, etc.).81 There 
also remains room to combine histories of visual objects with changing 
ancient theories of viewing and spectatorship, especially epistemologies 
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82 For some related work in this direction, see, e.g., Nelson 2000. On theories of intromission 
and extramission in the ancient world, see Lindberg 1976.1–17, Simon 1988, and Night-
ingale 2004.7–14. Morales 2004.1–35 provides one of the most stimulating introductions 
to Greek and Roman epistemologies of vision, while Bartsch 2006 investigates their col-
lective cultural remove from our own.
83 For a related rallying cry, see Porter 2009a.23: “The most productive, if least explored, way 
of confronting the problems of art and aesthetic reflection in antiquity is not by address-
ing this or that medium or literary or art criticism proper, but by transcending the barriers 
between the various art forms and their contemplation or analysis in order to arrive at 
what they share in common.”
84 For two different criticisms of such epistemological programs, see the articles by Neer 
and Tanner in this volume.
of  extramission and intromission, themselves so contested in the ancient 
world.82 Perhaps most pressingly, there is a need for renewed investigations 
into the shared language of ancient visual and literary critical response, 
founded around such Greek concepts as glykytês (“sweetness”), hôra 
(“seasonality”), hedynê (“delight”), alêtheia (“truth”), chrômata (“colors”), 
and habrotês (“elegance”).83 This volume, like the conference from which 
it stems, is intended as an invitation for further reflection on these (and 
other) topics and not as some fait accompli: we hope that others will pick 
up where we leave off.
We cannot promise that individual papers will agree with each other, 
the editors, or even with the founding premises of this introduction; indeed, 
it was very much our hope that they would not. Rather, this volume was 
conceived in a spirit of cross-disciplinary exchange—an attempt to build 
some intellectual bridges between the study of Greco-Roman visual culture 
and that of its social, cultural, and intellectual contexts. Some contributors 
privilege transhistorical modes, while others emphasize historical rupture. 
For all the differences in attitude, position, and outlook, however, each of the 
following papers seeks to forge new connections between different special-
izations within the field—whether comparing verbally mediated discourses 
with actual practices of visual production and consumption, relating ancient 
frameworks to modern theories of response, or dissecting the posthumous 
reception of ancient ideas, texts, and objects. In an academic climate where 
these different modes of analysis are all too often wrenched apart to form 
different disciplines, even confined to different academic departments, our 
aim is to demonstrate the merits of a more synthetic approach. 
Whether we associate this objective with clamors for a “new classi-
cal art history” or instead label it some new breed of “Greco-Roman visual 
culture studies,”84 the contributors remain convinced of the need to study 
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ancient and modern material alongside each other. Just as modernity can 
offer a cultural critique of ancient “art” and “art history,” so, too, can antiq-
uity shed light on the parameters of our own cultural horizons. If Greco-
Roman material is to recover its importance within the broader pursuit of 
art history, moreover, it must be through precisely this sort of comparative 
venture: this volume is offered to the advancement of that cause.
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